Economic analyses of emission permit trading have mainly looked into the cost effectiveness and cost saving potential of international permit trading compared to a pure national trading system. Little attention has been drawn to the environmental effectiveness of international trade in greenhouse gas emission permits. Less environmental ambitiousness caused by relatively low emission reduction targets in some countries might lower the permit price on the international market, but might also reduce environmental effectiveness. This paper considers the question under what conditions domestic markets of emission permits would and should merge to become an international market when environmental integrity has to be preserved and how environmental and cost effectiveness could be combined. In a two-country model three different policy instruments of the importing country are examined, namely a price instrument (tariff) and two quantity instruments (discount and import quota). All instruments restrict trade. The importing country (and regulator) prefers an import tariff and an import quota to a carbon discount. If the exporting country releases additional permits, the importing country should not try to keep total emissions constant, as that would be ineffective if not counterproductive. Instead, the importing country should aim to keep the total import constant; this would impose costs on the exporting country that are independent of the policy instrument; an import quota would be the cheapest option for the importing country. An import quota would also stress the idea of supplementary of the flexible mechanism as it increases the share of emissions reduced domestically. Compliance and liability issues constrain the market further. However, both the importing and the exporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of non-compliance, as sellers' liability would less constrain the market.
Introduction
The current international climate policy regime, defined by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol (KP), is based on legally binding emission reduction targets and international flexibility mechanisms, including trade in emission permits. However, progress in international negotiations is slow, and failure is not excluded. Some countries may be impatient, and regulate carbon dioxide emissions with a domestic market for emission permits. Denmark and the UK indeed have done so already. Or, if the international negotiations collapse, some countries may want to reduce emissions unilaterally, but reap the benefits of international flexibility mechanisms nonetheless. This paper investigates the question whether international trade in emission permits is possible without a multilateral treaty on emission reduction targets or even a multilateral treaty on regulating international trade. The answer to both questions is affirmative, contrary to the apparent belief of at least some of the negotiators on and analysts of climate policy. Although this paper is phrased in terms of climate change, its results hold for other transboundary externalities as well.
In this paper, there is trade between countries with different beliefs about the seriousness of climate change. We analyze the possibilities of regulating the international market with price and quantity instruments in a stylized two-country model. We find that it is in both countries interests to form an international market and it may even be beneficial to the environment.
Our two-country model can easily be generalized to many countries, and our approach might also be useful to investigate emissions trade between the U.S. and countries that ratified the KP, between the developing countries and the Annex B countries, and even between Annex B countries in a future commitment period. The policy instruments discussed in this paper might be used by countries who want to do more than other countries or than agreed on internationally. 1 There is little, if any, literature on this subject. The original literature on tradable permits is all framed in a domestic context. The literature on internationally traded permits almost unanimously assumes that there is an international agreement on at least the permit allocation. Boom (2001) , an exception, examines the effects on abatement commitments, total emissions and welfare of international emissions trading. Bohm (1992) and Helm (2000) also investigate the (re)distribution effects of trade, and thus implicitly the desire of countries to adopt different emission reduction targets with trade than without. However, these papers do not consider domestic or institutional regulation of the international market. Bradford (2001) proposes a "no-cap but trade" system in which countries voluntarily contribute money to a global organization, which subsequently purchases emission reduction where that is cheapest.
We share Bradford's lack of an international agreement on targets, and international costeffectiveness, but our mechanism is quite different.
Section 2 starts with a stylized model of two domestic emissions markets. Section 3 extends the model to include regulation by the importing country. Section 4 investigates whether the importing country can prevent the exporting country from issuing additional permits. Section 5 expands the analysis to liability issues, and examines the consequences for a bi-national market in emission permits. Section 6 concludes.
The case of two domestic emissions markets
Let us consider two countries, each committed to reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases. 2 Let us assume that the costs of emission abatement in one country are independent of emission reduction costs in the other country. 3 Let us first consider a simple model: A and B denote the two countries. C denotes emission reduction costs, R emission reduction, and T the emission reduction target. a is a parameter. The solution to (1) 
P denotes the amount of emission permits transferred from B to A; π is the emission permit price.
2 For simplicity, we discuss the case of only one greenhouse gas in the following sections, but the analysis could be easily extended to more. 3 See Kemfert et al. (2001) for alternative assumptions.
The first order conditions of (2) are:
where λ denotes the LaGrange multiplier. (3) solves as:
Without trade, the marginal costs of emission reduction are different for both countries. In (1) the marginal costs or the shadow values of the constraint (from here onwards: shadow price 4 ) are 2α A T A and 2α B T B , respectively. With trade, the marginal costs or the shadow prices are the same for both countries and are equal to the permit price. 5 See Table I. As expected, both countries gain from trade. For the buying country the costs of emission reduction become smaller and the selling country gets revenue for the exported permits.
Therefore, in the buying country the shadow price of emissions reduction goes down, as imported permits expand its options to meet the target. For the selling country, the shadow price goes up, as they reduce emissions in addition to their domestic target for export. This is not immediately obvious from (4). However, the shadow prices without and with trade are only equal at the point at which trade goes to zero: T  T  T  T   T  T  P   T In words, the shadow price of Country B is higher with than without trade up to the point that Country B stops exporting (P=0) and starts importing.
Obviously, the less similar the countries' targets and costs, the more room there is for trade, and the greater are the differences between shadow prices with and without trade. With trade, for both countries, a lower target in the other country implies lower costs for both countries, as it decreases the permit price and increases the amount of traded permits.
Domestic regulation of a bi-national market
The introduction of international trade in emission permits may induce the buying country to decrease the number of its emission permits. Because the costs of emission reduction are smaller, the buying country can afford a stricter target. (The reverse may happen in the selling country.) Trade raises its shadow price, and releasing additional permits would lower the shadow price to its marginal benefits of reduced climate change. There is no solution to this.
If the selling country adopts a less stringent target, it also lowers the shadow price in the buying country. And, if the buying country adopts a more stringent target, it also raises the shadow prices in the selling country. In fact, the ratio of the shadow prices is always 1:1.
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If the selling country increases the number of its emission permits, this is beneficial to their industry, but is at the expense of the environment. If the buying country reduces the number of its emission permits, this is beneficial to the environment, but is at the expense of their industry. If we assume the buying country to be a relatively environmental friendly country, an increase in the number of the emission permits in the selling country would not be received well in the buying country.
Quantity instruments: Carbon discount and import quota
Suppose the buying country decides to discount emission reduction in the selling country by a factor d, that is, instead of counting an imported tonne of carbon as 1tC it only counts as dtC.
With a carbon discount, the problem looks like: 
7 For given emission reduction targets, total emissions fall by (1-d)P. The shadow prices of both countries are given in Table I , as is their ratio. A carbon discount is not the only quantity instrument. Country A could also limit the amount of imported permits. For example, Country A has to achieve at least 50% of its total emission reduction domestically. A proposal with the same intention was adopted in May 1999 by the European Union Council of Ministers (8346/99) as a strategy to limit on the amount of traded permits with respect to the KP flexibility mechanisms and to stress the supplementary requirements. 9 With such an import quota the problem looks as follows: 
10 Unlike the carbon discount d, total emissions are not affected by the import quota g. The shadow prices of both countries are given in Table I , as is their ratio.
Introducing an import quota g has the same effects on the costs as a carbon discount has.
Compared to a situation of free trade it reduces the shadow price in the selling country and raises it in the buying country. If Country A restricts the amount of imported permits, imports would stay constant. For Country B, an import restriction would increase its costs. For Country A, an import quota would decrease the costs, because the quota reduces the permit price and more so if B's target is weak. This is not generally true -it depends on both 7 The first-order conditions and the solution are given in the appendix. 8 That is, the benefits of reduced climate change. 9 See Baron et al. (1999) , Woerdman (2001) and Westskog (forthcoming) . 10 The first-order conditions and the solution are given in the appendix.
countries emission reduction targets together with the extent of A's import restrictions. If trade is not affected by the constraint, that is A reduces more than required domestically, we have a free trade situation.
Price instrument: Tariff
Besides a quantity instrument, the buying country can also introduce a price instrument, like a tariff. A major difference with the quantity instruments is that Country A gains revenue by setting a tariff. We assume that the revenue is redistributed to the population without affecting the domestic market for emissions permits. With a tariff, the problem looks as follows:
with t ≥ 1. Total emissions are not affected by a tariff. The shadow prices of both countries are given in Table I , as is their ratio, which equals t/1. Introducing a tariff therefore also allows that the ratio of shadow prices equals the ratio of marginal benefits.
In general, the tariff drives a price wedge between the two national markets. It lowers the price for emission permits in the exporting country and raises it in the importing country but by less than the tariff rate. Country B sells less permits to A, and at a lower price. However, as with the quantity instruments, the shadow price of B falls and its total costs rise. Therefore, the threat of a tariff can also be used to deter B from flooding the market with permits.
Comparison of the different instruments
In this section, we use two numerical simulations to compare total and marginal costs for both countries to illustrate the differences and equalities of the different instruments with respect to costs. The relationship between discount and tariff (with t=1/d) to the quota follows from (A6). See also Table I where the ratios of the shadow prices are calculated.
Figure 1 displays total costs for both countries as a function of the discount, the tariff and the import quota. The costs of both countries always stay below the "no trade" case (with equal targets) regardless of whether trade is regulated or free, and whether discount, quota or tariff is used for regulation. With a higher tariff or quota or a lower discount, Country A always increases the amount of permits reduced domestically and lowers the amount of imported permits. That increases costs, if the permit price is unaffected. Country A loses out from both a tariff and a discount, but a tariff is always less expensive than a discount because of the 11 The first-order conditions and the solution are given in the appendix.
revenue of the tariff. Country A's costs increase for tariffs, discounts and larger quotas, but always stay below the no trade scenario. However, Country A gains from a small import restriction, but if Country A sets g high and lowers the amount of imported permits significantly compared to a free trade situation they would increase their costs, just as a tariff or discount would do. In setting import restrictions there is a trade-off between lowering the permit price and stifling imports.
A tariff is always more expensive to Country B than a discount. A tariff reaps some of B's producer surplus and transfers it to A. An import quota is always the most expensive instrument to Country B. The reason is, that the quota lowers the permit price more than a discount and a tariff, and at the same time it lowers the amount of traded permits also more than both discount or tariff.
The effects shown in Figure Table I . For R A =200 and R B =50; g varies from 0.7 to 9. F and the import quota. The figure confirms that trade increases the shadow price of emission control in Country B, and decreases the shadow price in Country A. Restrictions on trade make this less pronounced; indeed, if the discount, tariff or quota is set so high that trade ceases, the shadow prices of both countries return to their no trade levels.
14 A tariff and a quota make B's shadow price fall faster than does a discount; this is independent of param choice. A discount makes A's shadow price rise faster than does a tariff or quota; again, this is independent of the parameters. These effects are slightly more pronounced if B's target is weaker or its emission reduction costs lower. Table I . For R A =200 and R B =50; g varies from 0.7 to 9.
4
O more and more permits and pe far, we avoided the question whether Country A is able to do so. We did show that a discount, would lead to a loss to Country B if it has a relatively strict target. 15 On the other hand, Country B would gain if it sets a lower target. The trade-off between the two effects is shown in Figure 3 . We assume that if Country B lowers its target, Country A increases the disco so that total emissions stay constant 16 , preserving "environmental integrity". The benefits of a lower target would be greater than the costs of a higher discount. Only if Country B lowers its target substantially, could Country A deter Country B from issuing additional permits. 15 If Country B has a loose target, it would gain if Country A installs a discount -in that case, a discount would only encourage Country B to loosen its target further. 16 The equation for this follows straightforwardly from (A3). Country A can influence total emissions with a discount as it drives a wedge between total emissions and total emission reduction targets. Total emission stay always below the emiss re are therefore not suited to preserve "environmental integrity" at first sight, but they might support A's effort to prevent country B from choosing a too low emission reduction target.
Country A might use those instruments as an deterrent. Therefore, we turn our attention to tariff, discount and quota as a means for Country A to regulated the amount of imported permits.
17 Figure 4 shows the trade-off between the two effects. The target of Country B is varied, a the intensit p the three instruments. A discount is more expensive than a tariff, and a tariff is more expensive than a quota. Using a discount would increase the amount of emissions reduce internationally significantly, but at A's expense.
The amount of traded permits is equal for a discount, a tariff and a quota (by construc and the permit price is equal as well. So, for Country B, the total costs are the same, regardless of the instrument. As can be seen from tion), Figure 4 , the combination of a lower target and a more stringently regulated market increases the costs of Country B.
So, if Country A aims at the import of permits, it can deter Country B from flooding the market with permits. Country A's preferred instrument is an import quota.
Figure 4. Total costs of Country B for three cases. In the first case ("lower target"), tariff, discount and quota are kept constant and B's target is varied (from 90 to 40). In the second case ("both"), both the tariff, the discount respectively the quota (tariff from 1 to 3.15, discount from 1 to 0.25, quota from 0.94 to 2.75) and B's target are varied and exactly offset . The literature on compliance and liability for greenhouse gas emission permits is placed in the context of the Kyoto Protocol, that is, trad re all intending to limit the traded permits to quantities in surplus to sellers' compliance needs.
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These rules can be divided into three groups: (1) the seller, (2) the buyer or (3) both liable for non-compliance by the seller. Unfortunately, no first best rule can be determined.
Furthermore, all are likely to have a significant impact on the market. In this section, we discuss the two main principles, sellers' and buyers' liability. Ultimately, firms must justify their emissions to the domestic regulator, so that buyers' liability applies to permits acquired from abroad.
19 At COP-7 in Marrakech in November 2001 a compliance penalty including suspension of eligibility to use the flexibility mechanism and a deduction of any first-period shortfall from the allocation for the second commitment period was agreed; UNFCCC (2001). However, the legal text on compliance was delayed after the Protocol has entered into force. 20 A survey of proposals is presented in Baron (1999) and Nordhaus et al. (2000) .
In Sections 2 and 3, we assume that every company complies with the regulations, and t Under buyers' liability the problem looks like:
with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. 23 In fact, the carbon exchange rate d has the same effect as the "carbon rating"
(1-p), if Country B's companies have a lower standing in the carbon rating. in the price, the result is similar to introducing a tariff (but, again, without the revenues).
Alternatively, permit sellers could play safe, and plan to overcomply. Let m denote for the ri of non-compliance by the seller set by the selling country.
The problem then looks like: with m ³ 0. 24 Total emissions fall by µP. Table I shows the shadow prices of both countries, e ratio of the two. That ratio is (1+m)/1. Sellers' liability, like buyers' liability, di tates the ratio of e shadow prices; this ra is only by coincidence equal to the ratio of the marginal benefits of emission control.
In the following two sections, we use numerical simulations to first compare both liability principles and then include the regulatory instruments into the analysis. The equations for the relation of costs from discount, tariff and quota under sellers' or buyers' liability are taken from Table I .
Comparison of buyers' and sellers' liability
Figure 5 compares the gains of trade under sellers' and buyers' liability to a situation of free trade. 25 Country A always prefers sellers' liability, which is obvious. Country B prefers buyers' liability if its target is loose, and sellers' liability if its target is stricter. The reason that Country B prefers to be liable itself is as follows. Sellers' liability is more expensive to B at the margin (see below). However, buyers' liability constrains the market much more than does sellers' liability (see below), and this is more costly to Country B than are the costs of bearing liability. This is independent of parameter choice. For both countries, the differences between buyers' and sellers' liability are greater if the target (of B) is stricter, but this matters more to B than it does to A. Both countries are better off, if p or are close to zero, that is, the risk of non-compliance is fairly low. However, if the target is stricter, and the market is tighter, the losses due to uncertainty are larger.
and th c th tio
The first-order conditions and solutions are given in the appendix. 25 Free trade is the situation where the selling country fully complies (100%) with their emission reduction target and no risk of non-compliance occurs (p=µ=0). As noted above, the market is far more responsive to buyers' liability than it is to sellers' liability. Under buyers' liability, the market breaks down at
whereas, under sellers' liability, at
and, without compliance problems, at ere are no liability issues, and the same is true with liability issues, regardless of whether the r n has proportionally a larger effect on the buyers' side than on the sellers' side.
Compliance, liability and environmental integrity
So far, we assumed that country A does not regulate trade, for example to avoid contradictin their more ambitious target with relatively cheap emission permits from B. Below, we examine the relation between buyers' and sellers' liability and the policy instru d above. The optimization problems are given in the append conditions and the solutions. Table I summarizes some of the results.
Combining sellers' liability or buyers' liability with a carbon discount, a tariff or an impor quota has the expected effect on the shadow prices of both countries. For example, liability regulation increases the shadow price of Country A, and liability plus regulation increases the shadow price more. A discount rate increases A's shadow price faster th buyers or the sellers of permits are liable for non-compliance. And so on. The same is true fo the total costs. As shown above, both liability and regulation reduce the size of the market, and restrain the range of parameters for which there is any trade. The same is true for liability plus regulation. Figure 7 displays the discount and the tariff at which the market breaks down (P=0) as a function of the uncertainties underlying buyers' and sellers' liability. Liability constrains the room for regulation; the greater the uncertainty about traded permits, the less room there is to regulate the market with a tariff or discount. As before, the trade-off betwee tariff and discount is d=1/t, regardless of whether buyers or sellers are liable. Also, buyers' liability constrains the market more than does sellers' liability, regardless of whether the market is regulated with a tariff or a discount. 26 The first-order conditions and the solutions are given in the appendix. 
Discussion and conclusion
T c merge to become an international market. We focus on the case of two countries. It seems le likely to achieve both cost effectiveness and en p We show that international trade benefits both countries. This is hardly surprising, as all has this effect. We also show that the international trade is environmental neutral, that is, tota emissions stay the same. This is the case with all tradable permit systems. However, we argue that there might be pressure in the importing country to strengthen its emission reduction policy, while in the exporting country might be an incentive to weaken its
The importing country can regulate the market with price (a "carbon tariff") and quantity (a "carbon discount" or "import quota") instruments. This can be done to smoothen regulatory differences between the countries (e.g., monitoring and enforcement), but also to encourage the selling country to accept a stricter target they intended or to deter the exporting country from issuing additional permits for export only; if the latter is the goal, the importin g country hould seek to keep the amount of imported permits constant, rather than the total emissions.
xporting country would prefer that the permit seller is liable in case of on-compliance. Regulation constrains the market, and makes both countries in most cases worse off.
Structural differences in the reliability of domestic and foreign permits, and structural differences in settling non-compliance claims in the home country and abroad would also constrain the market, but less so for sellers' liability than for buyers' liability. Both the importing and the e n The analysis presented here needs extension in at least three directions. Firstly, more countries need to be considered. So far, the analysis was limited to the case of two countrie only. A lot of the results carry over to the case with more than two countries, although th analysis becomes considerably more complex. The real complication lies in arbitrage. If countries keep the H marginal emission reduction costs or to prevent too much import from certain other co -they would have to reckon with fairly complex feedback on their action. Arguably, the more countries there are in the market, the less control each country has over its emission reducti policy. Secondly, the choice of domestic emission standards should be made explicit. Thi the domestic market of emission permits needs to be modeled. Fourthly, the analysis s be extended to multiple greenhouse gases. This is straightforward if both countries use th same exchange rates between gases, but introduces additional friction if not. These tasks are deferred to future research.
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APPENDIX
The problem of the binational market with a carbon discount rate is:
The first order conditions of (6) are:
(A2) solves as:
If d=1, (A3) returns to (4).
With an import quota, the problem looks like: 
The first order conditions are:
Total emissions stay the same.
This solves as (4), unless R A <γP; in that case:
With a tariff, the problem looks as follows:
with t ≥ 1.
The first order conditions of (A4) are: 
with m ³ 0.
The first order conditions are: (1 ) Under buyers' liability and an import quota, the problem looks like:
2 2 min + s.t.
(1 ) and ; min s.t.
with 0≤ p ≤ 1 and g > 0.
Total emissions stay the same. This solves as:
(1 ) 2 2 ( (1 ) ) (1 )
Under buyers' liability and a tariff, the problem is:
with 0≤ p ≤ 1 and t >1.
The first order conditions of are: 
with m >0 and 0≤ d ≤1.
The first order conditions are: (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) a a m a a m a a m 
with m >0 and g > 0.
Total emissions stay the same. This solves as: 
with m >0 and t >1.
The first order conditions are: (1 ) (1 ) 
